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In Wyatt v Vince ([2015] UKSC 14), the Supreme Court allowed the ex-wife of a poverty-stricken 
traveller turned multi-millionaire to proceed with her Matrimonial Causes Act financial claim 
commenced decades after separation and later settled ([2016] EWHC 1368 (Fam)). Waudby v 
Aldhouse [2016] EWFC B63 was an opportunity for consideration of Wyatt’s implications in a less 
dramatic case and after a full hearing. 
 
Gary Waudby (‘the husband’) and Julie Aldhouse (‘the wife’) married in 1982 and had no children 
together. The husband had a failed car business, prompting the wife to work at two jobs, and both 
were declared bankrupt following a building dispute and resulting ruinous litigation. The wife 
suffered a breakdown at the time of the bankruptcy petition, causing her to retire on medical 
grounds, albeit that she was later employed and self-employed. The couple separated in 1994 
following the wife’s discovery of the husband’s affair and shortly before the building dispute trial, 
divorcing in 1995. At some point, the husband became a pilot and seemingly enjoyed some 
prosperity with his newer wife and children. 
 
The wife waited some 20 years after separation before applying for financial provision, apparently 
because she still loved the husband and believed his fallacious assurances that he would provide for 
her voluntarily. Despite his deception and her continuing health difficulties, she had been able to 
pursue employment opportunities, sustain a cohabiting relationship for a period and survive without 
any financial support from the husband. The 2014 application was apparently prompted by an 
annual reduction of around £4,000 in her sickness pension due to an improvement in her 
psychological health. In 2015, Deputy District Judge Shedden made a lump sum order worth 
£10,000 and a joint lives periodical payments worth £9,576 annually. The rationale purported to be 
based entirely on need, specifically that generated by the wife’s health problems, caused in turn by 
childlessness, the husband’s infidelity and ‘stringing her along’, and her loss of home and 
bankruptcy. 
 
The husband successfully appealed. In the Family Court, Judge Mark Rogers queried whether the 
orders had truly been based entirely on need. The DDJ had referred to the wife’s contributions, and 
Judge Rogers wondered whether that was ‘introducing questions of sharing or even compensation 
into the equation’ on the basis that the wife’s support of the husband and his career choices ‘was a 
long term and continuing factor in the Husband’s wealth creation abilities’ (para [26]). This, 
according to Judge Rogers, ‘was potentially dangerous and might have rendered [the DDJ’s] 
decision unsafe’, albeit that he was prepared to give her ‘the benefit of the doubt’ and treat the 
decision as solely based on identified needs (para [26]). Contributions were described as one of the 
‘magnetic factors’ in Wyatt (para [36]), which is unusual given the preferred focus on non-
discrimination and sharing and implies that there could be a rare ‘sharing’ of (post-separation) non-
matrimonial property where such contributions were made and support for the contributor was 
previously unavailable (B Sloan, ‘Delay, Changing Fortunes and the Financial Consequences of 
Divorce in England and Wales’ in W Pintens and C Declerck (eds), Patrimonium 2015 (die Keure, 
2015), paras [15]-[19]). In light of Wyatt, Judge Rogers’ observations that there was ‘nothing to 
share’ at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings (para [26]) may therefore be beside the point. It is 
not entirely clear whether Judge Rogers’ criticisms of the DDJ on ‘contributions’ relate to their 
irrelevance in principle (which appears inconsistent with Wyatt), their being insufficiently clear on 
the facts, or the DDJ’s failure to distinguish them from need (the latter two criticisms being more 
valid). 
 
Judge Rogers rejected the suggestion that the DDJ’s decision was wrong in law because of the 
delay itself: the Supreme Court had chosen not to set a limitation period in Wyatt. The appeal 
therefore turned on the exercise of discretion, even if the DDJ had concentrated on delay as not 
precluding an award rather than its ability to reduce one.   
 
On needs, Judge Rogers noted that the DDJ had not made much comment on the wife’s success in 
supporting herself or her motivations for making the application in 2014, and had underestimated 
the importance of her cohabiting relationship.  What ‘most trouble[d]’ Judge Rogers was the issue 
of ‘the causal link between the relationship and need’ (para [35]). This relies on Baroness Hale’s 
focus on relationship-generated needs in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane ([2006] UKHL 
24, para [138]), and (as with the Supreme Court in Wyatt) Judge Rogers omitted to acknowledge 
Lord Nicholls’ suggestion that non-relationship-generated needs might be relevant (Miller, para 
[11]). In any case, Judge Rogers declined to investigate whether even Baroness Hale regarded a 
causal link as essential on the basis that the DDJ did and that a possible ‘free standing award’ could 
not justify upholding an order made 20 years after separation (para [39]). Whatever the merits of the 
opposing argument (Sloan, ‘Delay, Changing Fortunes and the Financial Consequences of Divorce 
in England and Wales’, para [13]), on the needs point Judge Rogers is consistent with the restrictive 
approach in Wyatt. 
 
While the DDJ had ‘no difficulty’ in finding a causal relationship, Judge Rogers’ had ‘acute’ 
difficulty with her approach (para [40]). She had acknowledged the lack of evidence regarding the 
effect of the husband’s conduct on the wife’s mental health but invoked ‘common sense’ to give it a 
central role nonetheless. On Judge Rogers’ analysis, ‘the attribution…of the Wife’s mental health 
problems to events more than 20 years earlier and to the parties’ relationship without a firm expert 
or other proper evidential base was wrong and invalidates the discretionary approach’, particularly 
given the absence of a nuanced analysis in light of the DDJ’s admission that the causation was 
partial. The invocation of ‘contribution’ and a failure to adjust given that the husband had never 
paid anything in the first place was regarded as an unsound basis on which to appropriate his post-
marital assets (three cars and savings) for the making of a lump sum order to alleviate the wife’s 
personal liabilities.  
 
Judge Rogers described the joint lives order as ‘most surprising and controversial’ (para [46]), 
especially since such an order made at the time of divorce would probably not have survived the 
wife’s cohabitation or her relative prosperity before the reduction in her pension. He noted that the 
periodical payments order was for the exact amount of the shortfall identified in the wife’s 
submitted budget, meaning that it ‘seems driven by arithmetical necessity rather than the need to 
balance the positions of the parties and all the circumstances of the case in order to achieve a fair 
outcome’ (para [46]). Having held the exercise of discretion to be ‘fatally flawed’ (para [48]) and 
excessively motivated by sympathy, Judge Rogers substituted a dismissal of all financial claims 
because the unchallenged factual findings taken at their highest disclosed no basis for an award. 
 
Since Deputy District Judge Shedden had purported to focus solely on needs and set out to find a 
causal link between the relationship and those needs, it is perhaps unsurprising that her decision 
was overturned given the absence of evidence.  It is interesting to speculate what might have 
happened if she had concentrated on ‘contributions’, as suggested in Wyatt. Waudby will reassure 
those fearful of Wyatt that a claim made decades after separation will not always succeed. Despite 
their different outcomes, and whatever the difficulties on contributions and sharing, Lord Wilson 
and Judge Rogers’ judgments nevertheless seem consistent on needs. Above all, Waudby is a 
further reminder of the importance of formalising arrangements at the time of separation, even if the 
current financial health of the parties makes it appear fruitless. 
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